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 ABSTRACT 
While children demonstrate the ability to understand others’ intentions as early 
as 6 months of age, they are not able to verbally answer questions about intentions 
until between 3 and 6 years of age. The present study was designed to explore whether 
different question formats influence the accuracy of children’s responses to questions 
about intentions, and whether the development of executive attention plays a role in 
children’s ability to answer questions about intentions. Seventy-nine preschool 
children between 3 and 5 years of age were recruited for this study. Children viewed 
videos of playground events involving two main characters. Within this video there 
were three events which were performed either on purpose or by accident. After the 
video, children were asked a series of questions including prompts about the intentions 
behind the three target events. Children were significantly worse at answering 
questions about intentions as compared to questions which did not involve intentions. 
Children demonstrated an overall “yes” bias for intentions and non- intentions 
questions.  For intentions questions, this means that they were most accurate when 
they were asked yes/no questions where the answer should be “yes” (Match) and least 
accurate when they were asked yes/no questions where the answer should be “no”  
(NonMatch). They were equally accurate at Match and forced-choice questions. There 
was an interaction with age for the non-intentions questions so that younger children 
were more prone to demonstrate a “yes” bias and show increased accuracy for Match 
questions and decreased accuracy for NonMatch questions. Younger children were 
equally accurate at Match and forced-choice questions, and more accurate at forced 
choice questions than NonMatch questions. Executive attention measures predicted 
children’s accuracy for NonMatch, non intention questions. The results are discussed 
in terms of forensic applications. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Research on the development of intentional understanding has taken two 
complementary perspectives. The first line of research is largely cognitive and 
emphasizes children’s early abilities to understand the intentions of others. The second 
line, focusing on linguistic research, has demonstrated the limitations of young 
children’s understanding of intentions. Studies have shown that although the ability to 
comprehend others’ intentions may exist at a very young age (Behne, Carpenter, Call, 
& Tomasello, 2005; Meltzoff, 1995; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004), children may not be 
able to verbally communicate this understanding effectively until much later (Baird & 
Moses, 2001; Piaget, 1932; Smith, 1978).  
Infants appear adept at understanding others’ intentions in non-linguistic 
situations. Meltzoff (1995) demonstrated 18 month old children could replicate an 
adult’s intended action, even when that action was not successfully performed by the 
adult. In this study, adults attempted to perform tasks involving manipulating two 
objects, and repeatedly failed. When 18-month-olds were given the same objects they 
performed the intended action and not the failed action that the adult had performed, 
indicating that intentional understanding begins developing well before children 
become competent language-users. Since Meltzoff’s study, other researchers have 
attempted to identify the earliest indications of intentional understanding (Behne et. 
al., 2005; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Legerstee, Barna, & DiAdamo, 2000; 
Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky, & Tidball, 2001), demonstrating intentional competence as 
early as 6 months of age (Hamlin et al, 2007; Legerstee et al., 2000).  
Early studies examining children’s abilities to understand others’ intentions 
focused on children’s limitations in verbally communicating about intentions (Piaget, 
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1932; Smith, 1978). Piaget (1932) presented young children with images of adults 
performing intentional and unintentional actions and then questioned the children 
about whether or not the adults were morally at fault for those actions. Preschool-aged 
children based their judgments more on the effects of the acts than on the apparent 
intention behind them, implying that children do not fully understand the influence of 
intentions on one’s behavior until late in their preschool years. Since Piaget’s work, 
other researchers have found conflicting results concerning children’s abilities to 
verbally communicate about intentions. While some data have supported Piaget’s 
findings (Astingtion & Lee, 1991; Baird and Moses, 2001; Schult, 2002; Smith, 1978), 
other studies have demonstrated more precocious competence in the domain of 
intentionality (Moses, 1993; Shultz, Wells, & Sarda, 1980). The earliest estimates 
suggest that children may be able to answer questions about intentions by three years 
of age (ex: Moses, 1993), while later estimates suggest that children are not consistent 
at this ability until as late as six years of age (ex: Smith, 1978).  
Given the evidence that children can comprehend the intentionality behind 
actions before their first birthday but do not demonstrate the same competence when 
language is involved, the challenge for preschool-aged children is likely more 
linguistic than conceptual. However, children are rarely inhibited from attempting to 
answer questions when they are unsure of the correct answer (Battin & Ceci, 2003), 
and more importantly, they may often sound credible when they answer closed-ended 
questions about intentions (ex: Kulkofsky, Klemfuss, & Ceci, unpublished raw data).  
For example, preliminary data from a previous study suggest that children do 
in fact have difficulty answering directed questions about intentional acts of the form 
“Did she do it on purpose?” (Kulkofsky et al, 2007). In this study children witnessed a 
staged event during which “Miss Baker” baked cookies for her friend’s birthday in 
class with the children. One week later the children were given the opportunity to 
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recall everything they remembered about the event, and then the interviewer asked a 
series of misleading questions about the event. If children did not assent to these false 
questions, the questions were followed up with increasingly more suggestive 
techniques. First with peer pressure “are you sure? The other kids told me she did”, 
next with authority pressure “it’s really important I know the truth, did ______ 
happen”, and lastly, with a prompt to imagine that the event did in fact take place and 
describe it.  
The question of interest to the present study is “did Miss Baker pour too much 
salt on purpose”. Over 70% of children in the Kulkofsky et al. study incorrectly 
answered that yes, she did after just one interview.  This result is particularly dramatic 
given that the other rates of suggestibility were 60.8% for questions suggesting that 
“Miss Baker” wore a yellow rather than a blue apron, 47.1% for the suggestion that 
she brought gummy bears rather than M&Ms, 33.3% for questions suggesting that the 
children had been allowed to eat the cookie dough (they had not), and 21.6% of 
children assented that Miss Baker had placed a sticker on her knee when in actuality 
she handed it to them. Interestingly, children were often more accurate when they 
were immediately asked to elaborate. For example, when one child was asked, “did 
Miss Baker pour too much salt on purpose”, she responded “yes she did. I know that”. 
However, when the interviewer followed up with the question “What can you tell me 
about that?” the child answered “...So she put some salt in it, then she poured too 
much, and then that was an accident”. Therefore, this child falsely assented to the 
intentionality question, but then immediately afterwards in free recall, provided a 
correct response using intentional language correctly. Importantly, in this example, the 
child used more assertive language in the false assent than in the open-ended question, 
making her appear more credible when she in fact was less accurate.  
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While the studies mentioned above illustrate the limitations in children’s 
abilities to accurately answer questions about intentions, and hint at the unfortunate 
conclusion that inaccuracy for these types of questions can coincide with children 
sounding credible, they do not sufficiently address the issue of why this happens.  
One explanation for children’s difficulty in answering questions about 
intentions is that the language is too complex or that the format of the questions is too 
difficult to monitor for the intentions of the interviewer. In other words, the children 
may be unclear as to what the interviewer wants to know. For example, language that 
adults typically associate with intentionality may be beyond preschool aged children’s 
understanding. Further, questions about intentions may be more complex than 
questions that do not involve intentions because in essence, they have an extra clause 
imbedded (ex: Did she do it [on purpose]”. Indeed, when interviewers use more 
complex language in child-directed questions, children’s accuracy is lower than when 
interviewers use simple, age-appropriate language (Carter, Bottoms, & Levine, 1996). 
Although questions about intentions may be unnecessarily confusing in many 
situations, in other cases, it may be critical to know the intentions behind an act that 
only a young child witnessed as in the case of child injury. Distinguishing between 
accidental harm and intentional harm inflicted on a child would likely have very 
different legal consequences.  
The leading nature of yes/no questions provides a second explanation for 
children’s mistakes when answering questions about intentions. Suggestibility 
research demonstrates that closed-ended questions as opposed to open-ended questions 
may lead to increases in false assents and suggestibility (Peterson, Dowden, & Tobin, 
1999; Peterson & Bell, 1996; Poole & Lindsay, 1995), particularly when asked by an 
authority figure (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987). The complex and confusing nature of 
questions about intentions may heighten young children’s suggestibility. These two 
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explanations may work together so that when a child is confused about how to answer 
an intentional question, they may use the credibility and perceived perspective of the 
interviewer, coupled with interviewer-provided suggestions, to falsely assent to the 
question.  
Further, previous research has indicated that even when children do not have 
sufficient knowledge or ability to answer an interviewer’s question, they try anyway 
(ex: Brady, Poole, Warren, & Jones, 1999; Peterson & Grant, 2001). This may be 
because they feel pressure to perform well for the interviewer (Ceci and Bruck 1993). 
It may also be because children learn about conversational strategy before they learn 
that responses to questions should be accurate (Steffenson, 1977, cited in Choi, 1991). 
In other words, children learn that they should provide some sort of response to a 
yes/no question before they learn that this response should be correct. Further, 
children may be practicing their understanding of intentional language. Language has 
been demonstrated to assist in the development of such related concepts as theory of 
mind by giving children practice talking with other people and by allowing mothers to 
help scaffold children’s understanding (Astington, 1999). Children may be 
subconsciously attempting to answer these questions in hope of getting positive or 
corrective feedback. Therefore, perhaps children use the language of intention before 
they are able to reliably connect the concept of intentionality to the words for 
intentionality. This trial and error conversation strategy is particularly dangerous in a 
forensic setting because children often sound more accurate than they are (Battin, 
2004).  
These results combined with a body of research on children’s accuracy indicate 
that if interviewers rely solely on open-ended questions, children can be highly 
accurate, even about complex, or confusing topics. However, despite the fact that 
every forensic interview protocol to date recommends the use of free recall and open-
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ended questions, the rates of open-ended question used in practice are dwarfed by the 
number of closed ended questions. Lamb and his colleagues (1996) found that only 
2% of questions used in a sample of forensic interview transcripts were open-ended. 
Other studies which have examined the rates of yes/no questions in actual interview 
transcripts estimate their rate of usage in forensic interviews at between 64 and 73 
percent (McGough & Warren, 1994; Walker, 1993; Warren et al, 1996).  
 In addition to the main issue of whether preschoolers are able to accurately 
answer questions about intentions, it is also interesting to determine why they are 
making these errors. One potential explanation is that children may misunderstand 
questions such as “Did she do it on purpose?” because they misinterpret which part of 
the question the interviewer is interested in (did she do it vs. do it intentionally). In a 
sense, when children are interviewed about another person’s intentions they must keep 
in mind not only the intentions of the actor in the observed event, but also the 
intentions of the interviewer. They must understand that the interviewer is seeking 
information regarding the intentions rather than outcome of an event, the interest of 
most interviewers.  
If, for example,  children are more adept at answering questions about actions 
than mental states, they may be more competent at answering descriptive, action-based 
parts of a question such as “Did the grown up bump into the littler girl?” as opposed to 
the intention portion of the question “Did the grown up bump into the little girl on 
purpose?”. The second part of the question, which an adult would recognize as the 
portion the interviewer actually wants answered, involves understanding both the 
intentions of the actor and of the interviewer. Children’s mistakes in this type of 
question may occur because to them, questions about intentions are compound 
questions, and they answer the portion about the act itself (“Did the grown up bump 
into the little girl?”) before they answer about the intentions behind the act. Children 
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may also answer based on the “action” portion of the question because of 
underdeveloped inhibitory control (Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995). Young children may 
not be able to inhibit their response long enough to wait for the full question. If this 
were the case, children would have already processed their response to the first part of 
the question (“Did the grown up bump into the little girl?”) before they even begin to 
think about the second part of it (“Did she do it on purpose?”).  
In summary, I hypothesize that children’s difficulties in answering interview 
questions about intentions may be a product of leading influences and difficulties in 
monitoring complex questions. In the present study, I compared children’s responses 
to yes/no questions with those from forced choice questions, the latter of which make 
salient both parts of the interviewer’s request—was the act performed and was it 
performed deliberately. I propose that yes/no questions are leading about both the act 
itself, and more importantly, about the intentions of the act because yes/no questions 
necessarily suggest one option (in this case, on purpose, or by accident). In contrast, 
forced choice questions imply that the act itself took place, but offer no judgment 
about the intentions behind the act because they provide all of the possible solutions 
(again, on purpose, OR by accident). Secondly, forced choice questions require an 
answer specifically about the intentions of the act because it only allows for two 
possible answers “on purpose” or “by accident”. The forced choice may serve as a cue 
indicating that the interviewer is more interested in the actor’s intentions than in the 
act itself.  
Because I hypothesize that children’s errors are often based on underdeveloped 
monitoring skills, I also administered two executive attention measures to shed light 
on the process(es) through which children regulate their responses and select the key 
components of the interview questions. Specifically the present study investigated the 
influence of mental flexibility and effortful control on children’s responses. These 
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components should function together to allow children to compare multiple solutions 
and select the most appropriate, and to allow the child to focus their attention on key 
components of the task. I predict that overall children with higher scores on the 
executive attention tasks will be more accurate when asked about intentions. This 
prediction is based on our hypothesis that young children’s incorrect responses may 
sometimes be a product of monitoring difficulties. These findings should be most 
robust in conditions that require children to hold conflicting representations (ie: Non 
Matching yes/no questions). Therefore, I predict that the format of the intentional 
question will influence children’s accuracy. If monitoring difficulties and 
suggestibility lead to incorrect answers in response to questions about intentions, the 
forced-choice format should reduce incorrect answers because it is both less leading 
and directs the child’s attention to the portion of the question regarding the intention 
of the interviewer. In essence, the child cannot simply answer “yes” or “no”, but must 
reply with “on purpose” or “by accident”. Finally, if children do in fact answer 
incorrectly because they are answering the descriptive outcome question instead of the 
intentional question, we would expect that they would falsely assent to all leading 
questions about events that did happen regardless of the actual intention portrayed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
METHODS 
 Participants. Seventy-nine preschool children between 3 and 5 years of age 
(mean = 4 years, 3 months; range 3, 3 – 5, 7) were recruited for this study. The final 
sample was approximately 50% female (N = 40). Children’s demographic information 
was gathered through teacher reports, and there is consequently a considerable amount 
of missing data concerning child ethnicity and parent education.  Of the children for 
whom ethnicity was provided (N = 51), the majority were Caucasian (N = 41). The 
remainder were Asian (N = 3), Hispanic (N = 3), African American (N = 2), of mixed 
decent (N = 1), or “other” (N = 1). In the portion of the sample for which parental 
education information was provided (N = 43 for mother’s education, N = 35 for 
father’s education), nearly every parent achieved at least a college degree (N = 74) and 
of those, many also had an advanced degree (N = 38).  
Preschoolers were recruited from preschools in and around a Northeastern 
research university. Permission from the preschool administrators, teachers, and 
children’s parents were obtained before beginning data collection. As compensation 
for participation teachers received ten dollars at the completion of the questionnaires, 
and each participating classroom received a small gift of books or toys.  
 Apparatus. Data collection took place in quiet, isolated rooms at the preschool 
locations. Each room contained a table, a chair for the child, and a chair for the 
experimenter. Video clips were presented on laptop computers (~14” screen) and 
children’s interviews were recorded on digital audio recorders.  
 Stimuli. Children were shown one of eight two-minute video clips each 
featuring the same adult, an eight-year-old child, and a ten-year-old child . Each of the 
eight videos was composed of three events which appeared to be performed either 
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intentionally or accidentally depending on the condition in addition to several neutral 
events (see Appendix A). Whether each event was performed on purpose or by 
accident was determined randomly and resulted in each child viewing exclusively 
intentional events, exclusively unintentional events, or a combination of intentional 
and unintentional events. The video also included other scenes of the adult and the 
child playing at the playground which were the same for all videos.  
Materials. Executive attention was measured by the Inhibitory Control 
dimension of the Child Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ; Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & 
Fisher, 2001) as well as the Dimensional Card Sort task (DCCS; Frye et al, 1995).  
The CBQ Inhibitory Control dimension  includes the CBQ dimensions of Low 
Intensity Pleasure, Smiling/Laughter, Inhibitory Control, Perceptual Sensitivity, and 
Attentional Focusing. For example, “When picking up toys or other jobs, usually 
keeps at the task until it’s done”, is an example of an item tapping Attentional 
Focusing. The original CBQ was slightly modified for use with children’s teachers 
rather than caregivers. For example, questions outside of reasonable expectations of a 
teacher’s knowledge such as “Enjoys taking warm baths” were removed. These 
changes resulted in a 44-item teacher-rated questionnaire, in which Items were rated 
on a 7-point Likert scale from “extremely untrue of this child” to “extremely true of 
this child”. Children were given overall inhibitory control scores by reverse coding 
items which were negatively associated with inhibitory control and summing these 
reverse coded scores together with children’s ratings on the rest of the items. These 
totals were then divided by the total number of rated items for each child’s inhibitory 
control score. The CBQ is useful as a more global, teacher-reported measure of 
children’s effortful control and will be compared with children’s scores from the 
DCCS. This measure has been demonstrated to be consistent, stable, and valid- 
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measured by multiple converging measures of validity (Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & 
Fisher, 2001).  
 The DCCS is a task measuring the executive skill of mental flexibility. In the 
DCCS children are presented with cards, one at a time, and are asked to sort them into 
two bins based on some characteristic of the card. For example, a picture of a blue 
triangle could either be classified into a bin with other triangles, or with other blue 
things. The experimenter made the sorting rules explicit to the children and changed 
the rules throughout the task. This task has been used to measure executive abilities, 
especially mental flexibility (ex: Muller, Dick, Gela, Overton, & Zelazo, 2006).  
Again, our hypothesis was that children with good executive skills of the sort needed 
to shift between relevant characteristics will be more likely to process both parts of the 
key questions simultaneously. Children’s scores were determined by taking the sum of 
total correct responses and dividing by the total possible correct responses. 
 Procedure. There were six members of the research team, the primary 
investigator and five trained undergraduates. Each interviewer made an initial visit to 
the preschool at which they later interviewed in order to interact with the children and 
become familiar to them. These sessions lasted approximately one hour each.  
During the first interview the experimenter chatted with the child for a few 
minutes to establish rapport. Once the child was seated and comfortable the 
interviewer introduced one of the eight brief video clips as “a movie about a grown up 
and a little girl playing on a playground”. Immediately after viewing the video, the 
children were asked a randomized series of 25 questions (see Appendix B) 
Children were asked questions about events that happened to confirm that they 
remembered seeing the event occur (3), they were asked questions about the intentions 
of witnessed events (3), questions about the intentions of non-witnessed events (3), 
yes/no questions about witnessed events with no intention (6), forced choice questions 
 11
about witnessed events with no intention (6), and open-ended questions about the 
intentional events that did happen (3). All but the last question category included 
exclusively yes/no, 2-option forced choice, or a combination of the two question types.  
The subset of questions which asked about the intentions of witnessed events is 
of primary interest in the present study. Within this category each child was asked 
three question types. The first type is a “Match” question. Match questions were 
yes/no questions in which the correct answer should be “yes”. In other words, if a 
child was asked “Did the grown up bump into the little girl on purpose?” and the 
grown up did in fact bump into the little girl on purpose, the correct answer would be 
“yes” and this would qualify as a “Match” question. The prompt in the question 
matches the event. NonMatch questions were just the opposite. These were yes/no 
questions where the answer should be “no”. The prompt did not match the event. The 
final question type about witnessed, intentional events was “Forced Choice”. These 
were questions in which children were presented with two options and asked to choose 
between them. For questions about intentions these options were “on purpose” or “by 
accident”. For example, “Did the grown up bump into the little girl on purpose or by 
accident”.  
These last three questions in the interview were open-ended and were intended 
to give children the chance to elaborate on their responses and explain their answers. 
Though very few children added new information, and of those that did, the new 
information was often incorrect or irrelevant.  
In the second visit, interviewers administered the DCCS. We also asked the 
children’s teachers to complete a demographic form and the CBQ for each 
participating child.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESULTS 
Analysis Plan 
Initially, a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) was performed with 
children’s accuracy as the response variable. This model included Intentionality of 
Question (Intention vs. Non Intention question), Question type (Match, NonMatch, 
Forced Choice), and children’s age (~3-4 years, ~5-6 years) as independent variables 
along with all combinations of interaction effects with Intentionality of Question. The 
finding of this analysis was a main effect of Intentionality of Question (X2 = 31.15, p < 
0.01). Children were significantly less accurate when they were asked questions about 
intentions. Figure 1 depicts this difference by presenting the mean responses for each 
intentionality category. For the remainder of the analyses intentions questions and non 
intentions questions were examined separately in order to more sensitively determine 
patterns within intention and non intention questions.  
Accuracy and Question Type 
Non Intention Questions. Data were subjected to a GEE with children’s accuracy as 
the response variable. The original model included question type (Match, NonMatch, 
and Forced Choice), question order (four randomly designed question orders), video 
type (8 versions), CBQ score, DCCS score, age, and gender. Preliminary analyses 
demonstrated that there was no main effect of age, gender, question order, video type, 
and no effects of CBQ score or DCCS score. The final model was reduced to include 
only question type, question type*age, CBQ score and DCCS score. The executive 
attention measures were kept in the model because though they were not significant, 
they are of important theoretical significance. Specific comparisons were done through 
the differences of least square means. The right side of figure 1 shows the differences 
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between the means by question type. Figure 2 illustrates the interaction between 
question types. 
The main findings are that children appear to be equally accurate at matching 
yes/no questions and 2-option forced choice questions, they are significantly better at 
matching yes/no questions as compared to non matching yes/no questions (X2 = 7.43, 
p < 0.05) and significantly better at forced choice questions as compared to non 
matching yes/no questions (X2 = 8.37, p < 0.05). Linear contrasts revealed that 
children are no better at forced choice questions than they are at yes/no questions 
overall (ie: matching and non matching yes/no questions combined). 
However, the pattern is marginally different for older children (range = 4yrs, 
5mo; 5yrs, 7mo; N = 32) than for younger children (range = 3yrs, 11mo; 4yrs, 3mo; N 
= 46) (X2 = 5.35, p = 0.07). There was no effect of question type for older children. In 
other words, for older children, accuracy for Match questions was no better than for 
any other question types, and their accuracy for Forced Choice questions was no better 
than for Non Match questions. Therefore, the younger children appear to be driving 
the overall effects of question type. The younger children were more accurate at 
Matching questions than Non Matching questions (X2 = 7.75, p < 0.05), and more 
accurate at Forced Choice questions than they were at Non Match questions (X2 = 
11.32, p < 0.01). For example, a child would be more accurate when asked a question 
such as “Did the little girl sit on the swing?” because the correct answer was “yes” 
(the little girl actually did sit on the swing), than if the child was asked a question such 
as “Did the grown up have a red jacket?” (the jacket was actually black). A child 
would also be more accurate when asked “Did she go on the swings first, or down the 
slide first?” compared to when the child was asked a yes/no question to which the 
answer should be “no”. However, older children are not significantly better at any one 
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question type than are younger children (see figure 2). This may be because younger 
children have increased accuracy in the Match condition because of the “yes” bias.  
Intentions Questions. In order to look at intentions questions separately, these data 
were also subjected to a GEE with children’s accuracy as the dependent variable. The 
original model for intentions questions included question type (Match, NonMatch, and 
Forced Choice), intention of the original event (on purpose, by accident), question 
order (four randomly designed question orders), video type (8 versions), CBQ score, 
DCCS score, age, and gender. Preliminary analyses demonstrated that there were no 
effects of age, gender, question order, video type, or executive attention measures. It 
should be noted that the model for the intentions questions did not show the age x 
question type interaction that the non intention model demonstrated.  The final model 
was reduced to include only question type, intention of the original event, CBQ score 
and DCCS score. Specific comparisons were done through the differences of least 
square means. The left side of figure 1 shows the differences between the means by 
question type. Figure 3 illustrates that there was no interaction between age and 
question type for intentions questions.  
The overall pattern of results for question type was similar to that of non 
intentions questions. Children were equally accurate at Match and Forced Choice 
questions, and more accurate at Match questions than at NonMatch questions. While it 
appeared that children were also more accurate at Forced Choice questions than at 
NonMatch questions, the p-value became marginal after controlling for multiple 
comparisons. See table 1 for detailed results. Again, linear contrasts revealed that 
children are no better at forced choice questions than they are at yes/no questions 
overall. 
There was also a main effect of intention in predicting child accuracy (X2 = 12.42, p < 
0.01). Children were more accurate overall when they were asked about events that 
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were performed unintentionally (µ = 0.53, ơ = 0.50) than when they were asked about 
events that were performed intentionally (µ = 0.39, ơ = 0.49).  
Response Bias 
Discrimination and Criterion estimates were calculated for each child’s 
performance on yes/no and forced choice questions without intention, as well as for 
children’s responses overall (across children) for each of the intentions questions 
(yes/no and forced choice) using Signal Detection Theory (Green & Swets, 1966). I 
was limited in the types of discrimination and criterion calculations I could conduct 
because each child got only one matching intention question, one non matching 
intention question, and one forced choice intention question. This design was limited 
by the presumed limited attention spans of preschool aged children precluding the use 
of a lengthier testing session. Therefore, criterion scores were used to approximate 
children’s biases, while their raw scores were used for the bulk of statistical analysis. 
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Figure 1. Percent of children correct as a function of question content and 
question type. 
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Figure 2. Percent of children correct as a function of the interaction of question 
type and age for non intentions questions. 
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Figure 3. Percent of children correct as a function of the interaction of question 
type and age for intentions questions. 
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Table 1. Results of least square means predicting accuracy from event actual 
intention and question type for intentions questions.  
Variable Intention 
Question 
Type     Intention 
Question 
Type  Estimate   χ2
P-
value
Intention      Accident       Purpose      -1.07 12.42 <0.01
Question 
Type   
Forced 
Choice   Y/N-yes    0.48 2.01 0.16 
Question 
Type   
Forced 
Choice   Y/N-no    -0.79 4.55 0.03 
Question 
Type   Y/N-yes   Y/N-no    -1.26 10.15 <0.01
 
Overall, children were biased to respond “yes” to yes/no questions, and to 
respond with the second option when asked forced choice questions.  The “yes” bias 
was consistent for both non intention questions (d’ = 2.88, C = -0.52) and intentions 
questions (d’ = -0.54, C = -0.50), as was the second position bias (intention: d’fc = 
3.56, C = 0.52; non intention: d’fc = 0.91, Cfc = 0.46). For example, if a child was 
asked, “Was the climbing structure made of plastic?” she would be biased to respond 
“yes”. If a child was asked “Did the little girl go on the swings first, or did she go 
down the slide first”, the child would be biased to answer that the little girl went down 
the slide first. Though the assent bias cannot be regressed with age for the intentions 
questions because it is approximated by a single score, there was a significant 
interaction between yes bias and age for the non intentions questions.  The “yes” bias 
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decreased with age, and in fact, the oldest children in the sample exhibited a moderate 
“no” bias (β= .22, p = 0.05). Children were also biased to choose the second option 
(by accident) when they were asked about the intentions in an event which they never 
saw (t = 4.66, p < 0.01). For example, a child would be more likely to respond that the 
adult stepped on the flower by accident, than they would be to respond that the adult 
stepped on it on purpose, when the child did not see the adult step on a flower. A 
logistic regression with accuracy as the dependent variable and age as the independent, 
continuous variable demonstrated that children’s responses to this question did not 
differ by age. 
The Non Match Condition 
 Analyses were also conducted to determine whether the children who 
performed well in the Non Match condition were different from the children who 
performed poorly in this condition. While performance on Non Matching non 
intention questions did not predict children’s performance on intention questions, 
CBQ did predict their performance on Non Matching non intention questions (X2 = 
7.39, p = 0.01).  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DISCUSSION 
Accuracy and Question Type 
 This study provides further evidence that the form and content of the questions 
that interviewers pose to young children influences children’s response accuracy. The 
findings that accuracy levels differed between non intentions and intentions, and that 
accuracy levels varied by question type in both groups illustrates this point.  
That children have difficulty reliably answering questions about intentions is in 
line with previous research, however, children in this study were not just unreliable, 
they were significantly below chance. In fact, even in the Match condition, when 
response bias should lead to higher accuracy, children were performing no better than 
chance. This is especially surprising considering that there were no age effects for the 
intentions questions and that the oldest children in this sample were nearly six years 
old.  
The dramatic decrease in accuracy between the non intentions questions and 
the intentions questions is likely a product of the language of intention. While 
previous research is fairly convincing that very young children and infants have some 
concept and perception of intentionality, it appears that children have extreme 
difficulties accurately using the language of intention even late in the preschool years. 
This is especially surprising considering earlier observational evidence that preschool-
aged children use intentional language, and evidence that they respond credibly to 
intentions questions (Kulkofsky et al, 2007).  
While there were significant effects of question type in this study, these effects 
wash out when yes/no questions are combined and contrasted with 2-option forced 
choice questions. In other words, in forensic settings, where the interviewer would not 
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in fact be aware of whether or not the correct answer to a yes/no question should 
actually be “yes” or “no”, there is no accuracy benefit to asking young children yes/no 
questions as compared to forced choice questions, or vice versa.  
 It is also of note that for the non intentions questions only the younger children 
were influenced by the type of question posed to them. Older children were equally 
accurate at all three types. The obvious explanation would seem to be that the older 
children would have accuracy scores closer to ceiling, and thus we would not be able 
to detect variability between the question types. However, this was not the case. The 
older children were no more accurate at any type of non intention question than the 
younger children, which is interesting in itself. This is likely an effect of differing bias 
scores. Whereas older children’s accuracy was consistent across question type, young 
children’s “yes” biases led to lower relative accuracy in the NonMatch condition.  
Response Bias 
The scope of the signal detection analysis was necessarily limited in this 
project. Signal detection is generally used with adults due to the large number of 
repeated question types necessary for full analysis. Therefore, in this study 
discrimination and criterion estimates were calculated as approximations of response 
biases for this sample of children. Overall analyses were not controlled for bias. 
Rather, I ran the analyses with children’s raw scores, and separately calculated mean 
bias scores across children to give a sense of children’s behavior when asked about 
varied content using varied question types.  
 As presented above, in both the non intentions questions and the intentions 
questions, children were biased to respond “yes” to yes/no questions, and biased to 
respond with the second option when asked 2-option forced choice questions. The 
finding that children have “yes” biases when asked about intentional events is not 
surprising given the literature on leading and suggestive questioning (Ceci and Bruck 
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1993). For example, Ceci and Bruck (1993) point out that children often respond in 
accordance with what they perceive as the interviewer’s bias. Therefore, if the 
question format indicates that the interviewer believes that an event happened on 
purpose, the child being interviewed may be more inclined to respond in accordance 
with this belief.  However, the finding is contrary to research demonstrating that 3  
year old children show no clear bias, and 4-5 year old children display “no” biases 
when answering questions with words they do not understand (Fritzley and Lee 2003). 
This discrepancy may be an effect of different methodologies, for example, Fritzley 
and Lee used nonsense words rather than actual English words beyond the child’s 
abilities. Therefore, older children’s “no” biases may be an understandable reaction to 
being asked about something they immediately recognize as a non-occurring event, 
namely a nonsense concept which does not exist.  Thus, children’s biases may change 
depending on whether they recognize a confusing word as a word or not.  
That children were more accurate in both conditions when answering matching 
yes/non questions as opposed to non matching yes/no questions is likely a product of 
response bias. However, response bias does not necessarily explain the finding that 
children were equally accurate at matching yes/no questions and forced choice 
questions. It may be the case that children have equal “yes” and “second position” 
biases, however, it may also be the case that having the correct response embedded in 
the question cues an increase in accurate responses. The question “Did she do it on 
purpose?” and “Did she do it on purpose or by accident?” both include the phrase “Did 
she do it on purpose”. If this were true to the event, these questions formats might help 
children correctly respond that the event was done on purpose. However, asking the 
child whether the event was performed by accident provides no cue.  
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Accident Bias 
The second position bias for the intentions question is confounded with a 
possible “accident” bias. Because the order of the two options in the forced choice 
questions were not counterbalanced we cannot know from this data whether children 
were biased to respond that an event they witnessed an adult perform was accidental, 
or whether they simply have a recency bias which is consistent with the non intentions 
condition and with previous research (Walker, Lunning, & Eilts, 1996, cited in 
Peterson & Grant, 2001). Additionally, children were significantly more likely to 
report that events that they did not witness the adult perform were done by accident as 
opposed to on purpose when given a forced choice between the two. This may be 
because children assume that if they did not notice, or recall the event taking place, it 
was likely to be unintentional. Or, it may be the case that while children do make the 
error of implicitly agreeing that a non-witnessed event took place, they attempt to 
minimize the error by claiming that the act was accidental. A final and unpredicted 
form of potential accident bias was demonstrated across all question types. Children 
were more likely to be accurate if they were asked about an event that was performed 
by accident. However, this effect may be partially driven by the fact that children’s 
second position biases necessarily result in increased accuracy for forced choice 
questions in which the correct answer should be “accident”. This is not the whole story 
though, because children are also more accurate at yes/no questions when they involve 
accidents rather than intentional events. This finding cannot be explained through 
biases because if children were operating solely on a yes bias they would be equally 
likely to answer “yes” to questions asking about accidents and questions asking about 
intentional events. The accident bias may have come about because children construed 
the events as having primarily negative outcomes, and they believed that adults do not 
intentionally do bad things. For example, Battin (2004) found that when children 
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viewed videos of an adult performing a negatively valenced event, they were more 
likely to falsely pluralize the number of actors throughout an interview about the 
event. However, when the event was positively valenced young children were more 
likely to give a correct, singular attribution of the actor. In other words, if the adult 
performed an event that was “bad” 3-5 year old children were more likely to 
consistently say that “they” did it without further specification, when in fact only one 
person performed the act. This may be an indication that children attempt to diffuse 
the blame behind negatively perceived acts performed by adults. Or, it may be just the 
opposite. Leslie, Knobe, and Cohen (2006) found that preschool aged children tend to 
judge negative outcomes as being products of purposeful acts, and positive outcomes 
to be products of accidental acts. However, in the Leslie et al study the actors were toy 
props, and not an adult as in the present study. Further study is required to elucidate 
this finding.   
Executive Attention 
Contrary to my original hypothesis, neither measure of executive attention had 
a reliable effect on children’s accuracy in either content condition. Executive attention 
was predicted to influence children’s accuracy through two separate mechanisms. The 
first process was through focusing of attention during the original task, the second was 
through superior question comprehension and conversational abilities. However, it 
seems that either these convergent measures of executive attention are tapping 
something other than monitoring and attention, or that children do not rely on these 
abilities in order to retain information and respond to questions in the short term. A 
possible explanation for the overall null findings for the non intentions questions may 
simply be that for the most part, children performed quite well at these questions. 
Perhaps there was not enough variability in overall accuracy for executive attention to 
have much impact, bearing in mind that these children all came from middle class 
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families and were probably all average or above average intellectually. Perhaps these 
measures failed to predict because of truncated range. This will require future research 
with broader ranges of family SES. However, executive attention was even less 
predictive of children’s accuracy on intentions questions. This implies that children’s 
difficulties in answering intention questions goes beyond monitoring. The explanation 
may be as simple as vocabulary. Perhaps preschool-aged children are not yet able to 
reliably understand the meaning behind intentional language. However, this is worth 
further exploration, especially given our preliminary data demonstrating that children 
spontaneously use intention language (Kulkofsky et al, 2007).  
Non Match Condition 
 The Non Matching condition was singled out because it is theoretically the 
most challenging condition for preschool aged children. Non Match questions require 
a child to maintain conflicting representations, one representation of the actual event, 
and one of the alternatives posed in the interview question. That children’s accuracy 
on the Non Matching non intentions questions did not predict their scores in the 
intentions conditions is somewhat surprising because one would expect that a child 
who performs well at the most complex question type would also perform 
comparatively well overall. However, it seems to be the case that in the intentions 
conditions particularly, children are driven by response biases rather than by a 
systematic answering strategy. Given this possibility, it makes sense that their scores 
in a more cognitively controlled category would not necessarily map onto their 
guessing responses. Additionally, if they are using an unidentified strategy beyond 
bias, it is ineffective and unlikely to map onto the effective strategies they are using to 
answer non intentions questions.   
 While responses on Non Match non intention questions did not predict overall 
accuracy in the intentions category, children’s Non Match non intention accuracy was 
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the only factor that was predicted by an executive attention measure. Again, if children 
were guessing randomly in the intention conditions it makes sense that executive 
attention measures would not predict their performance there. It also follows logically 
that because Non Matching questions require children to monitor conflicting 
representations, executive attention would be more predictive of this question type 
than any other in the non intentions condition.   
Implications 
 It seems that whether children are asked questions about intentionality or not, 
they are biased to respond “yes” to yes/no questions, and biased to respond with the 
second option when asked 2-option forced choice questions. These biases emphasize 
the impact that interviewers have on children’s accuracy. For the most part, children’s 
accuracy hinges on the types of questions they are asked. However, in forensic settings 
any benefits for the match question type are washed out by the fact that actual 
investigators do not know the accuracy of the question they are asking and so in real 
life Match and Non Match yes/no questions should be considered equivalent. In this 
study, children were equally accurate when they were asked forced choice questions as 
compared to when they were asked yes/no questions overall. This is a positive finding 
for the non-intentions questions because children were quite accurate overall when 
yes/no questions were combined.  
 However, though the effects of question type were even more pronounced in 
children’s responses to questions about intentions, children’s accuracy was only at 
chance in the most accurate condition. Importantly, this accuracy level was achieved 
when children were asked matching yes/no questions, which interviewers cannot 
control for in the field. Further, the propensity for children to respond “yes” to yes/no 
questions led to a staggering number of false assents. False assents can be extremely 
dangerous in interviews. For example, a false assent may imply guilt in a case of 
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accidental touching or injury. Further, assents in general shape the way interviewers 
perceive a case and influence the direction of further questioning. This may happen 
because a child’s assent to a question implying intention may give the interviewer an 
“intention” bias, which has been demonstrated to lead to biased interviews (Bruck & 
Ceci, 1999). For example, if a child falsely assented that, for example, a caregiver 
intentionally injured them, the interviewer would be likely to incorporate this false 
information into further questioning, possibly cementing it into the child’s testimony.  
 Therefore, in cases in which intent may be at issue, it may be important to 
establish a specific child’s competency at answering questions about intentions. 
Currently, no state requires or recommends this precaution. Further, this study 
confirms previous research that verbal measures are likely to provide low 
intentionality competency estimates for preschool-aged children. A direct application 
of the results of this study may be to encourage those charged with interviewing 
children in forensic settings to question children about intentions nonverbally. For 
example, Lyon has done work on another forensically relevant abstract concept, 
children’s understanding of truth and lies (Lyon, 2000, 2002; Lyon & Saywitz, 1999, 
2000). In this work he has demonstrated that children are far more accurate at 
demonstrating their competency in this area when they were given visual scenarios 
and provide behavioral responses to those scenarios. This is also in line with the infant 
research mentioned earlier, in which children were able to demonstrate some 
intentional understanding through gesture and eye gaze (ex: Legerstee & Barna, 2000; 
Meltzoff, 1995). 
 In summary, researchers and forensic interviewers alike must be aware that 
while children may sound competent to answer abstract questions, such as those 
concerning intentions, their accuracy performance on these questions can be quite 
poor, at times reliably below chance. Though children can be highly accurate when 
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answering yes/no and forced choice questions, they are also influenced by the form 
and content of the questions asked. We must be aware of these vulnerabilities when 
interviewing children in any capacity because, particularly in the context of intentional 
understanding, there is a risk of greatly underestimating children’s ability to 
understand intentionality, or, in converse, overestimating their competency to verbally 
communicate about intentions.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Intention Event #1: The adult either intentionally or unintentionally bumped into  
the child. In the intentional condition the adult looked directly at the child as 
she walks towards her and once she has bumped into the child the adult said 
“Ha! There!” In the unintentional condition the adult appeared distracted and 
did not look at the child until after she bumped into her. At this point, the adult 
will said “Oops! Are you OK?”.  
Intention Event #2: The adult either intentionally or unintentionally kicked a soccer  
ball. In the intentional condition the adult ran about 15 feet, then kicked the 
ball towards the child and another girl. At this point she said “Wow! Look how 
far that went!”. In the unintentional condition the adult again ran about 15 feet, 
and tripped on the ball, sending it towards the two girls. This time she looked 
surprised and said “Oops!” and the two girls jumped out of the way of the ball.  
Intention Event #3: The adult either intentionally or unintentionally spilled a cup of  
water. In both video segments the adult filled a cup with water from a water 
bottle. She then placed the cup in front of her on the table, looked away, and 
drummed her fingers on the table. In the intentional condition she then looked 
at the cup and knocked it off the table with her hand. Then, she laughed and 
pointed at the spilled water. In the unintentional condition the adult started a 
reaching motion and knocked the cup off of the table in the process. At this 
point, she covered her mouth with her hand, said “Oh no!” and looked at the 
spilled water in surprise. 
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APPENDIX B 
Events that did happen: 
1) Did the grown up bump into the little girl? 
2) Did the grown up kick the soccer ball? 
3) Did the grown up spill the water? 
Events that did happen with matching intention, mismatching intention, or forced 
choice: 
4) Did the grown up bump into the little girl on purpose/by accident/on purpose 
or by accident? 
5) Did the grown up kick the soccer on purpose/by accident/on purpose or by 
accident? 
6) Did the grown up spill the water on purpose/by accident/on purpose or by 
accident? 
Intentions questions about things that did not happen: 
7) Did the grown up throw the basketball on purpose? 
8) Did the grown up drop the doll by accident? 
9) Did the grown up step on the flower on purpose or by accident? 
Yes/No response bias controls (first three, answer: yes, second three, answer: no): 
10) Did the little girl play on the swings before the slide? 
11) Did the little girl sit on the swing? 
12) Did one of the girls slide down the handrails of the stairs? 
13) Was the climbing structure made of plastic? 
14) Did the grown up have a red jacket? 
15) Did the grown up fall off the climbing structure? 
Forced choice response bias controls: 
16) Did the two kids come with the grown up or meet her there? 
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17) Who was taller, the grown up or the little girl? 
18) Did the grown up get to the park first, or did the little girl? 
19) Did the little girl have brown or blond hair? 
20) Did the grown up push the little girl on the swing, or did the little girl push the 
grown up? 
21) Did the grown up go down the slide or did the little girl go down the slide? 
22) Was the grown up nice or mean? 
Open ended questions 
23) What else can you tell me about when the grown up bumped into the little girl?  
24) What else can you tell me about when the grown up kicked the soccer ball?  
25) What else can you tell me about when the grown up spilled the water? 
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